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I. Introduction
It seems that everybody loves workplace wellness programs. The
Chamber of Commerce has firmly endorsed those programs, as have other
business groups. 1 So has President Obama, and even liberal firebrands like
former Senator Tom Harkin. 2 And why not? After all, what’s not to like
about programs that encourage people to adopt healthy habits like
exercise, nutritious eating, and quitting smoking? The proponents of these
programs speak passionately, and with evident good intentions, about
reducing the crushing burden that chronic disease places on individuals,
families, communities, and the economy as a whole. 3
What’s not to like? Plenty. Workplace wellness programs are often
well-intentioned, and they are certainly pushed forward by an industry of
consultants who offer data that are facially convincing regarding their
value. But many workplace wellness programs push—if not exceed—the
boundaries of the law. A growing body of evidence indicates that reliance
†

Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
the hosts of this symposium for inviting my contribution, and to Sarah Scheinman
for able research assistance.

1.

See Ronald Loeppke, Wrap-Up, in WINNING WITH WELLNESS 25 (2016).

2.

Tom Harkin, Health Care, Not Sick Care, 19 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 1, 2 (2004);
Marianne Levine, Obamacare’s “Wellness” Gamble, POLITICO (May 13, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/2016/05/wellness-obamacare000114.

3.

See The Healthcare Leadership Council and the Congressional Wellness Caucus
Hold Briefing Titled “How Private Sector Wellness and Prevention Initiatives Are
Showing Quantifiable Results in Improving Health and Lowering Healthcare
RESEARCH
(Mar.
24,
2012),
Costs.”,
HIGHBEAM
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2617209161.html; Mehmet Oz & Mike
Roizen, Drs. Oz and Roizen: Five Secrets to Get Healthy at Work, BUFFALO NEWS (Apr.
2, 2016), http://www.buffalonews.com/columns/drs-oz-and-roizen/drs-oz-androizen-five-secrets-to-get-healthy-at-work-20160402.
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on workplace wellness programs to reduce the burden of disease is bad—
and likely futile—health policy. Although those programs may work well in
shifting health costs to sicker employees, this body of evidence indicates
that they are unlikely to actually improve health in any significant way. 4 And
workplace-wellness programs give employers a power over their workers’
private lives that we ought not to allow. Elsewhere, I have argued that, as a
matter of privacy and social equality, employers should not be permitted to
leverage their economic power over employees as a means of controlling
the aspects of workers’ out-of-work lives that wellness programs affect. 5
The remainder of this paper elaborates on the first of these points. I
focus on an important recent episode in the regulation of workplacewellness programs—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC” or “Commission”) adoption of new rules governing those programs
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 6 The Commission
promulgated those rules in a fraught political environment. 7 It had recently
brought three suits that offered hints that it would aggressively challenge
workplace wellness programs under the ADA. 8 After a business backlash to
those suits, the White House reportedly pressured the Commission to
reverse its stance; the new regulations, which came out after that
controversy, would significantly loosen restrictions on wellness programs. 9
4.

See, e.g., Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings
Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 468, 469, 471-72
(2013); Alfred Lewis et al., Employers Should Disband Employee Weight Control
Programs, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e91 (2015); Sharon Begley, Do Workplace
Wellness Programs Improve Employees’ Health?, STAT (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/19/workplace-wellness-programsemployee- health/; see generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care As an
Incentive for Healthy Behavior? An Assessment of the Affordable Care Act’s
Personal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 635, 640–41
(2014) (arguing that “personal responsibility reforms” like wellness programs
“reflect cultural biases that exaggerate the extent to which ill health is attributable
to the personal failings of unhealthy individuals and that they serve as a political
distraction from less punitive measures aimed at making our communities,
workplaces, schools, and marketplaces more conducive to healthy living”).

5.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV.
225, 252–53 (2013).

6.

E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d) (2016).

7.

See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, EEOC Issues New Rules for Wellness Programs,
WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016 5:20 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eeoc-issuesnew-rules-for-wellness-programs-1463433655.

8.

E.E.O.C. v. Orion Energy Sys. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d 841, 841-42 (E.D. Wis. 2015);
E.E.O.C. v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015); E.E.O.C. v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. CIV. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481 at *1 (D. Minn.
Nov. 6, 2014).

9.

See Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126
(May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); Jonathan Cohn, Big Business
Gets a Win on Controversial Workplace Wellness Plans, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16,
2015, 10:28 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/workplace-
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In particular, the regulations would allow employers to impose a significant
financial cost—up to thirty percent of the total cost of self-only health
coverage—on workers who refuse to submit private medical information as
part of wellness programs. 10
Part II discusses the legal questions that workplace wellness programs
present under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In that part, I argue that
the ADA, properly construed, would prohibit common elements of
workplace-wellness programs. In particular, the ADA requires medical
disclosures as part of a workplace-wellness program to be “voluntary;” I
argue that the best interpretation of that voluntariness requirement would
prohibit employers from imposing any financial incentives on employees to
reveal private medical information. Part III discusses the EEOC’s recent
regulations. I argue that those regulations not only fail to incorporate the
best interpretation of “voluntary,” but also fail to incorporate any
reasonable interpretation of the term—and, indeed, barely try to interpret
the term at all. Thus, I argue that the new regulation’s thirty-percent rule
should be invalidated. Part IV is a brief conclusion.

II. Workplace Wellness Programs and the ADA’s Voluntariness
Requirement
Much of the legal architecture and terminology classifying wellness
programs comes from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) as amended by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 11 and the
regulations implementing those statutes. 12 Under the HIPAA/ACA regime,
workplace-wellness programs come in two basic flavors, and the law
imposes distinct regulations on each flavor. What the law calls participatory
wellness programs provide some incentive or opportunity to participate in
an activity that the employer deems healthy. 13 Examples might include a
discount on membership in a gym, free participation in a smoking-cessation
program (perhaps with some additional reward for participation), or
incentives to obtain health screenings and education in healthy habits. 14
What the law calls health-contingent wellness programs condition
incentives on achievement of some health-related factor. 15 The factor can
be either completion of a health-related activity, such as an exercise or
wellness-eeoc_n_7083506.html; Jonathan Cohn, Obama is Smack in the Middle of
a Brewing Fight Over Workplace Wellness, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2015, 9:00
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/14/workplace-wellnessobama_n_684256.html.
10.

See infra notes 88 – 107 and accompanying text.

11.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012).

12.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1 (2016).

13.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii) (2016).

14.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii) (2016).

15.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(iii) (2016).
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smoking-cessation program (the law calls such a wellness plan “activitybased”), or the achievement of a health outcome, such as losing weight or
quitting smoking (the law calls such a wellness plan “outcome-based”). 16
HIPAA, as amended by the Affordable Care Act, contained a number of
requirements for health-contingent wellness programs, though it did not
meaningfully restrict participatory wellness programs. 17 But both sorts of
programs give rise to significant disability-discrimination concerns, even if
they fully comply with the regulations the ACA put into place. For one thing,
wellness programs might be constructed in ways that directly impose
barriers to participation by workers with particular kinds of disabilities. If an
employer incentivizes workers to participate in or complete an exercise
class, but that class is held in a facility that is not accessible to persons who,
say, use wheelchairs, then wheelchair users cannot receive the incentive. If
an employer incentivizes the achievement of an outcome standard that an
individual, because of her disability, cannot satisfy, that decision, too, will
exclude individuals with disabilities.
Key provisions of the ADA target employer practices that exclude
workers with disabilities in this way. In particular, the statute requires an
employer to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,”
unless that employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.” 18 As a result
of this provision, an employer who sets up a wellness program that imposes
barriers to workers with disabilities must make a reasonable
accommodation—such as by moving an exercise class to an accessible
space or giving disabled workers an alternative means of satisfying the
requirements of a health-contingent program—so long as that does not
impose an undue hardship. Fortunately, this principle is uncontroversial,
even if its application to particular wellness-program rules may not be. The
recent EEOC regulations specifically require reasonable accommodation in
circumstances like this, 19 and the ACA imposes parallel requirements. 20
The disability-discrimination issues do not end there, however. Many
wellness programs require workers, as condition of participating and
receiving whatever incentive is attached, to provide private medical
information to their employers or to the contractor that administers the
program. 21 But as Congress learned during its consideration of the ADA,
employers have often, upon learning about individuals’ disabling
16.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(iv), (v) (2016).

17.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)-(5) (2016).

18.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2016).

19.

See 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,141.

20.

See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)(iv), (4)(iv) (2016).

21.

See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Employer Wellness Programs Are A Great Idea—Right?,
NATION (June 1, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/employer-wellnessprograms-are-a-great-idea-right/.
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conditions, drawn overbroad conclusions about the limiting effects of those
conditions and either fired or refused to hire individuals with those
conditions. 22 Researchers and disability-rights activists have long noted the
existence of a spread effect, in which people reflexively think that an
impairment that limits some physical or mental functions is more broadly
disabling. 23 The stereotypes and fears that attach to many hidden
disabilities—disabilities that are not immediately obvious to observers—
may be even greater than those that attach to more obvious disabilities. 24
To address this issue, Congress constructed a complex set of rules
regarding when an employer may ask for or receive medical information
from an applicant or employee. 25 The ADA adopts different rules for each
of three stages of application and employment. First, during the job
application process and prior to the extension of an offer of employment,
an employer “shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of
a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability
or as to the nature or severity of such disability.” 26 At that stage, the
employer may ask an applicant about her “ability . . . to perform job-related
functions,” but not about what disabilities or medical conditions she has. 27
After an employer has extended a conditional offer of employment, the
rules for the second stage kick in. At that stage, an employer may require a
full medical examination, so long as all entering employees—or, at least, all
entering employees in a particular job category—must undergo the same
examination. 28 The results of such an examination must be kept
confidential, though they may be shared with supervisors and emergency
personnel as relevant to determine necessary work restrictions or
emergency medical services. 29
The rules governing medical examinations and inquiries at the first two
stages of hiring and employment serve to create a record of discrimination.
If an employer was willing to extend a conditional offer of employment at
the first stage, when it did not know of a worker’s medical conditions, and
then revoked that offer after learning of those medical conditions at the
second stage, the obvious conclusion is that the employer acted because of
those conditions. For employees with hidden disabilities, the first two
stages thus help to avoid the most difficult problem for most claims of hiring

22.

See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at *50 (1990).

23.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 423-24 (2000).

24.

See id. at 492-494.

25.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2012).

26.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012).

27.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2012).

28.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (2012).

29.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2012).
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discrimination—proving that a protected characteristic, and not some
other factor, caused the refusal to hire. 30
Despite the medical examination permitted after a conditional offer of
employment, many employees’ disabilities will remain hidden. Many
employers choose not to require medical examinations at the time of hire. 31
And many hidden disabilities develop after an employee starts work. To
protect workers with hidden disabilities at the third stage of the
relationship, Congress provided that an employer
shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries
of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity. 32

On its face, this provision would impose significant limitations on
participatory wellness programs that incentivize workers to provide
medical information. If an employer either requires a medical examination
or even makes an “inquir[y]” regarding disability—an inquiry the employee
could refuse to answer—the general rule requires the employer to show
that the examination or inquiry satisfies the relatively stringent “job-related
and consistent with business necessity” standard. 33
Wellness programs existed in 1990, and, just as today, they were
extremely popular with members of Congress and other elites. 34
Accordingly, the ADA provided an exception to the job-related/business30.

See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the CivilCriminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2008) (“Employment
discrimination cases are difficult to prove, especially since few cases turn up
‘smoking gun’ evidence of discrimination.”).

31.

See, e.g., Donald H. Stone, Pre-Employment Inquiries: Drug Testing, Alcohol
Screening, Physical Exams, Honesty Testing, Genetics Screening—Do They
Discriminate? An Empirical Study, 25 AKRON L. REV. 367, 367 (1991).

32.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).

33.

Nobody knows exactly what “job-related and consistent with business
necessity”—”which combine[s] relatively lenient language (‘job related,’
‘consistent with’) with stringent language (‘business necessity’)”—means. See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 1115, 1140 (2016). But employers are understandably unwilling to rest the
validity of their wellness programs on satisfying the standard.

34.

See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (Pt. II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1990) (“A growing
number of employers today are offering voluntary wellness programs in the
workplace. These programs often include medical screening for high blood
pressure, weight control, cancer detection, and the like. As long as the programs
are voluntary and the medical records are maintained in a confidential manner
and not used for the purpose of limiting health insurance eligibility or of
preventing occupational advancement, these activities would fall within the
purview of accepted activities.”).
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necessity requirement for “voluntary medical examinations, including
voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program
available to employees at that work site.” 35 That exception, and particularly
the voluntariness requirement that it imposes, has been the focus of the
recent legal controversies regarding workplace-wellness programs. 36
Voluntariness is an extremely contested concept in the law. Webster’s
defines “voluntary” as “proceeding from the will or from one’s own choice
or consent” or “unconstrained by interference.” 37 But, of course, all choices
are made under constraint. 38 A voluntariness requirement thus cannot
demand that a choice be free from all constraint or influence. Rather, a
determination that a choice is voluntary is necessarily a normative
judgment that the constraints under which that particular choice was made
are neither so great, nor of a sufficiently problematic type, for the law to
vitiate the choice. How one makes that normative judgment might depend
on considerations that are specific to the context in which a particular
choice is made, on one’s broader normative commitments, or both. For
example, a strong believer in a conventional libertarian understanding of
freedom of contract might say that, in the absence of force, fraud, or
perhaps an unusual degree of monopsony power, any condition imposed
by an employer on an employee is voluntary; after all, the worker can
always refuse the condition and look for another job. 39 Others might find a
lack of voluntariness precisely because it can be so difficult to find work
elsewhere if one loses one’s job. 40 Still others might find a work condition
inconsistent with voluntariness because it exceeds a normative limitation
on the proper power of employers. For example, I have argued that, as a
matter of social equality, employers should not be permitted to leverage
the economic power they have over workers to control their out-of-work
lives. 41
Although normative considerations like these are key to understanding
and applying a voluntariness requirement, they rarely appear on the face of
35.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2012).

36.

E.g. Michelle Andrews, Government Says Bosses Can’t Force Workers To Get
Health Tests, NPR (Dec. 2, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2014/12/02/367842386/government-says-bosses-cant-force-workers-toget-health-tests (discussing the EEOC’s lawsuit in Honeywell International).

37.

Voluntary,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/voluntary (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

38.

See generally Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood
Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2093, 2093 (1992).

39.

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 955 (1984).

40.

See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472 (1923).

41.

See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 253 (suggesting that workplace wellness programs
often violate that normative principle).
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statutes or court opinions. As a result, the normative work in determining
what is voluntary tends to take place offstage. So it is with the ADA’s
exception for voluntary medical inquiries that are part of an employeehealth program. 42 The statute does not elaborate on what is “voluntary” in
this context. 43 In 2000, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance that sought
to define the term: “A wellness program is ‘voluntary’ as long as an
employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees who do
not participate.” 44 That definition clearly rejected the libertarian freecontract position—a position that would leave no work for the ADA’s
voluntariness requirement, as conditions on employment would basically
never be involuntary if we accepted the free-contract premise.
But the EEOC’s guidance did not resolve the more difficult question of
what kinds of incentives—short of firing or refusing to hire—vitiate
voluntariness. Answering that question, under the EEOC’s definition,
required deciding what it means to “penalize” employees who refuse to
participate. But the concept of a penalty, too, is typically ambiguous and
contested in the law and often depends on the same sorts of normative
considerations that inform a determination whether a choice is voluntary.
What constitutes a penalty for refusing to participate in a wellness
program? One intuitive response is that a penalty is a negative incentive;
penalties are thus to be distinguished from rewards, which are positive
incentives. But this way of framing the question ends up, once again, just
pushing off the normative inquiry to another place. It’s a classic baseline
problem. 45 If a penalty (impermissible) takes something away from you
when you fail to take a particular action, and a reward (permissible) gives
you something when you do take that action, we need to figure out the
proper baseline against which to measure whether something has been
taken away from you or given to you.

42.

Rebecca Greenfield, Employee Wellness Programs Not So Voluntary Anymore,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
15,
2016,
7:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-15/employee-wellnessprograms-not-so-voluntary-anymore.

43.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (1990) (Stating merely, “[a] covered entity may
conduct voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories,
which are part of an employee health program available to employees at that
work site.”).

44.

U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related
Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with
(July
27,
2000),
Disabilities
Act
(ADA),
EEOC.GOV
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.

45.

See Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31-38 (1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987).
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A common approach to the baseline question is to look to legal
entitlements. 46 If one person offers another a choice between two
outcomes, both of which would deprive the second person of a legal
entitlement, that would render the choice involuntary. The paradigm case
is, of course, “your money or your life.” 47 But the prevalence of at-will
employment in the United States would mean that a baseline of legal
entitlements would provide no protection to most employees. “Sign up for
the wellness program or you’re fired” gives at-will employees an option that
would not deprive them of any legal entitlement because they have no
entitlement to their job. 48 The far more common proposition of “sign up for
the wellness program or forgo the opportunity to earn some money” would
seem at least as voluntary on this analysis—the lesser power included
within the greater. But a law that prohibited employers from making
medical inquiries as part of a wellness program unless participation was
“voluntary” and then treated participation as voluntary as a matter of law
whenever the workers were employed at will would do very little work.
There is no reason to believe that the Congress that enacted the ADA
intended for the provision to have such a minuscule scope. Nor would a
reasonable reader understand the word “voluntary,” in this context, as
imposing such a transparently thin requirement.
A fair approach to the baseline problem requires looking beyond the
prior legal entitlements of workers. One intuitive way of addressing the
problem would be to focus on the express form that an offer takes. If an
employer proposes to increase a worker’s base salary for participating in a
wellness program, that would count as a reward, while if the employer
proposed to decrease the base salary for refusing to participate, that would
count as a penalty. The problem here should be obvious: employers
generally have the managerial prerogative to set pay at whatever level they
want, so long as they do not discriminate based on specifically forbidden
factors such as race, sex, age, and disability. That basic fact makes a purely
formal approach highly manipulable. To take a stylized example, an
employer could set every employee’s salary at $30,000 but cut that amount
by $1000 for employees who refuse to participate in a wellness program.
Or the same employer could set every employee’s salary at $29,000 and
augment that amount by $1000 for employees who agree to participate in
the program. In terms of the financial cost to workers of refusing to
participate in the wellness program, these two regimes are the same.

46.

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972).

47.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.12 (2012)
(“‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive proposition, whether you have a single
dollar in your pocket or $500.”).

48.

See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws”, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 9–10 n.26 (1990).
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Should they receive decisively different legal treatment simply because of
the formal difference between them? 49
The argument that the formal difference should compel a different
result would rely heavily on the phenomenon of loss aversion—”the idea
that people tend to disfavor a loss from a given reference point more than
they favor an equivalent gain.” 50 An incentive that is framed as a threatened
cut in pay will be, all else equal, more likely to lead to compliance than an
incentive that is framed as a promised increase in pay. 51 But that does not
fully answer the question. For one thing, the effect on compliance will
depend not just on the formal framing of the incentive—pay cut or pay
increase—but, crucially, on its magnitude. It is easy to imagine that a
promise to add $1000 to the pay of those who participate in a wellness
program would lead to a greater uptake than a threat to cut fifty dollars
from the pay of those who refuse. If all we care about is the likelihood of
securing compliance, other factors are likely to be as important—and, in
many cases, more important—than the formal framing of the incentive as
an addition or cut to pay.
And why is the likelihood of securing compliance what we care about?
Employers adopt incentives—positive and negative—precisely because
they hope that those incentives will encourage workers to participate in
wellness programs. 52 It is certainly possible to say that any incentive makes
participation in such a program involuntary—that whatever else influences
an employee’s decision whether to participate, an employer should not be
able to put an additional thumb on the scale in favor of participation. But
49.

See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
A Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359, 1371-1374 (1984) (discussing
“history as a baseline”). A related formal approach would use an employee’s
existing salary as the base so that any offer of money beyond that salary counts
as a record and any deduction from that salary counts as a penalty. Alternatively,
one might use the salary an employee expected to be earing (taking into account
any anticipated salary increase) as the base. These approaches would have all of
the same problems articulated in the text, if not more. See infra note 51.

50.

Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129 (1994); see generally Eyal
Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 834-43 (2012).

51.

See generally Zamir, supra note 50, at 836. An employee’s reference point need
not be the salary that the employer designates as the base rate of pay. It might be
the salary the employee received immediately before the announcement of the
wellness program, or it might be the salary the employee previously expected to
be receiving (taking account of anticipated increases in pay) by the time the
wellness program was put into effect. The empirical psychological literature
suggests that employees might well adopt any of these possible reference points.
The uncertainty in identifying which reference point employees will adopt in any
particular context presents an additional difficulty in applying a formal positiveincentive/negative-incentive distinction. But even if we could solve that difficulty,
the more fundamental problem identified in the text would still exist.

52.

See, e.g., SOEREN MATTKE
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doing so requires an argument. And it cannot be an argument that is based
on the mere fact that an incentive is successful. To determine whether the
incentive renders a choice involuntary, we must ask not just whether the
influence was effective, but whether it was effective in a way that was, in
some way, normatively objectionable.
The better way of reading the ADA’s voluntariness requirement for
wellness programs, I would suggest, is that the requirement bars employers
from imposing incentives that give an employee “no fair choice” but to
participate. 53 What “no fair choice” means is, of course, an open question. 54
But it is easy enough to suggest some guideposts that connect to basic
purposes of the ADA.
Starting with the most general point, the ADA is, in the relevant respect,
a law mandating and limiting the terms of the employment relationship.
Employment laws like the ADA necessarily reject the libertarian freecontract premise that because workers can always seek another job we
should not be concerned about the terms imposed by private employers. 55
This rejection reflects, in part, a conclusion that workers are, in general,
asymmetrically vulnerable in the employment relationship—that it is
generally much easier for an employer to find another worker than it is for
an employee to find another job. 56 It reflects a conclusion that the
workplace itself is a location for the exercise of power with which the polity
might properly be concerned—that the law appropriately limits the ways
people with relatively more power treat others with relatively less,
particularly in a relationship like employment that is so central to the dayto-day lives of most adults. 57
These points come into sharper relief when we focus on the premises
of employment laws, like the ADA, that prohibit discrimination. Laws
prohibiting employment discrimination rest in part on the premise that
integration is a positive value—that it is in society’s interest for workplaces
to bring together people across all of the identity axes along which
discrimination is prohibited. 58 And they rest in part on the premise that
members of disempowered groups—whether defined by race, sex, age,
disability, or the other forbidden axes of discrimination—ought not to bear
greater burdens than their fellow employees. 59 In particular, if employers
are permitted to discriminate and some employers do, then members of
53.

See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How A Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 520 (2003).

54.

See id. at 521 (calling this concept “amorphous”).

55.

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 951.

56.

See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 238.

57.

Id. at 264.

58.

See ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 22 (2010).

59.

See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 228.
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discriminated-against groups will typically receive lower wages from those
employers who are willing to hire them. A key function of antidiscrimination
laws is to put all workers, when compared across the forbidden axes of
discrimination, on the same footing in dealing with their employers. 60
And recall the reason for the ADA’s prohibition on medical inquiries—
that those inquiries may reveal hidden disabilities and thus serve as an
occasion for discrimination. When an employer conditions a payment on a
worker’s agreement to provide medical information as part of a wellness
program, an employee with a hidden disability faces a choice: reveal the
information and place herself at risk of discrimination, or forgo a payment
that her nondisabled coworkers can receive without putting themselves at
similar risk. Seen in that way, the employer’s offer replicates paradigm
situations that the ADA aimed to prevent—the driving out of workers with
disabilities from particular workplaces and the suppression of their wages
in the workplaces that would hire them.
This analysis suggests a robust understanding of voluntariness in the
context of the ADA’s medical-inquiry provisions. A monetary incentive for
participating in a wellness program that requires employees to provide
otherwise private medical information, in this view, should render the
decision to participate involuntary. And that is precisely because such an
incentive puts workers with disabilities to the type of choice from which the
ADA was designed to protect them. It should not matter whether the
incentive is formally positive (“Earn extra money if you give us your
information”) or negative (“We’ll cut your pay if you don’t give us your
information”), even if an incentive framed as a pay cut is more likely to lead
workers to participate in the program. Nor should it matter whether the
money at stake is a lot or a little, even though we can expect that workers
will be more likely to participate in the program if more money is at stake.
What should matter is the structure of the situation—that the worker with
a disability must place herself at risk of discrimination or earn less money
than the employer would otherwise pay her. If an employer paid
nondisabled workers fifty dollars more per year than workers with
disabilities, that would constitute impermissible discrimination. And if
hiring discrimination by some employers had the overall effect of
depressing disabled workers’ wages by fifty dollars per year, that would be
a clear violation of the ADA notwithstanding the small monetary stakes. It
is the structure of the incentive, not the size, that matters.

III. The EEOC and Voluntariness in Wellness Programs
In Part II, I argued that the best interpretation of the ADA’s
voluntariness requirement would not permit employers to give workers any
financial incentive to provide private health information as part of a
60.

See Rachel A. Spector, “Dignified Jobs at Decent Wages”: Reviving an Economic
Equity Model of Employment Discrimination Law, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 123
(2015) (providing a nice recent discussion).

92

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The EEOC, the ADA, and Workplace Wellness Programs

wellness program. As I discuss in this Part, the EEOC has taken a
dramatically different approach. The Commission’s 2016 wellness rules
permit employers to impose large monetary costs, whether framed as
rewards or penalties, on workers who refuse to provide their health
information. 61 I argue that the portions of the new regulations that permit
those incentives should be invalidated.
Controversies regarding the application of the ADA to wellness
programs heated up significantly in the last few years of the Obama
Administration. The immediate trigger was the EEOC’s filing of a set of
lawsuits challenging the programs adopted by particular employers. 62
These lawsuits spurred a backlash from business interests, who heavily
lobbied the White House to get the Commission—nominally an
independent agency, but one made up of presidential appointees—to back
off. 63 After that lobbying effort, the EEOC announced its new regulations,
which adopted an extremely loose standard of voluntariness. 64
It happened like this: in the late summer and early fall of 2014, the EEOC
brought three well-publicized suits challenging employer wellness
programs. The first of these cases, EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.,
involved a wellness program in which participants were required to submit
a health-risk assessment and other medical information. 65 The EEOC alleged
that the employer shifted the entire health-insurance-premium cost,
including what would otherwise have been the employer’s share, onto
those workers who refused to participate. 66 The Commission also alleged
that the employer had fired a worker who refused to participate. 67 The
second case, EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., involved similar allegations. 68
Participants in the employer’s wellness program were required to submit a
health-risk assessment and undergo medical tests. 69 If employees refused
to participate, the employer canceled their health insurance and thus
required them to pay for their own insurance without any employer

61.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2016).

62.

See Orion Energy Sys. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 841; Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d
at 849; Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2014 WL 5795481 at *2.

63.

See Sharon Begley, Exclusive: U.S. CEOs Threaten to Pull Tacit Obamacare Support
Over
“Wellness”
Spat,
REUTERS
(Nov.
29,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-wellness-exclusiveidUSKCN0JD0AC20141129.

64.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016).

65.

See Complaint, E.E.O.C. v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01019, at ¶ 11 (E.D.
Wis., filed Aug. 20, 2014).

66.

See id. ¶¶ 16-18.

67.

See id. ¶ 20.

68.

See Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 851.

69.

See id. at 852.
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contribution. 70 Finally, in EEOC v. Honeywell, Inc., the Commission alleged
that the employer imposed additional costs of up to $4000 on employees
who refused to submit to biomedical testing as part of its wellness
program. 71
These cases met mixed success at best. The district court granted
summary judgment to the employer in Flambeau; 72 the Seventh Circuit
recently affirmed that judgment on procedural grounds without reaching
the merits. 73 The district court denied the EEOC’s motion for a preliminary
injunction in Honeywell, 74 and the EEOC did not pursue the case any further.
The EEOC and Orion Energy recently settled their case. 75
But the voluntary-wellness cases in the EEOC’s 2014 trio were more
important for the backlash they triggered than for the judgments the courts
reached. Particularly after the EEOC filed the Honeywell case, business
groups reacted harshly. They described the Commission’s actions as
“outrageous,” as targeting popular wellness-plan features such as premium
reductions for participation, and as creating a conflict between the ACA—
which allows quite significant financial incentives for wellness program
participation—and the ADA—which, in the then-apparent view of the
EEOC, did not. 76 A number of these groups complained to the White House

70.

See id.

71.

Honeywell, 2014 WL 5795481 at *1-*2.

72.

See Flambeau, 131 F. Supp.3d at 852. See id. at 855 (holding the employer’s
wellness program was protected under the ADA’s insurance safe-harbor
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (Stating that the ADA “shall not be construed
to prohibit or restrict,” among other things, an employer from “establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that
are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that
are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”); The court concluded that the
wellness program was a term of the employer’s health insurance plan—because
participating in the program was a condition of receiving insurance—and that the
insurance plan underwrote, classified, or administered risks. See Flambeau, 131 F.
Supp.3d at 855-856. Although engagement with that question would take me
beyond the scope of this essay, it should be apparent that the Flambeau court’s
decision reads the safe-harbor provision as creating a ready means of evading the
ADA’s substantive provisions. The better reading of the safe-harbor provision, I
would suggest, would interpret it as applying only to those plan rules that
themselves underwrite, classify, or administer risks—and not to other practices
that an employer decides to tie to receipt of health insurance. In this respect, my
views largely accord with those of the EEOC. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,130-31,131.

73.

See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941 (7th
Cir. 2017).
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and threatened to withhold any further support for the Affordable Care Act
unless the EEOC changed its approach to this issue. 77
In the wake of this pressure, in April 2015, the EEOC issued proposed
regulations addressing the application of the ADA to workplace-wellness
programs. 78 The Commission issued its final rule, which tracked the
proposed rule in the relevant respects, in May 2016. 79 That rule requires
that any workplace wellness program “be reasonably designed to promote
health or prevent disease.” 80 It also provides a very specific definition of
“voluntary” for determining whether medical inquiries associated with
workplace health programs are permissible. 81 To be voluntary, according to
the EEOC’s new rules, the program may “not require employees to
participate” or otherwise retaliate against employees in violation of the
ADA; 82 must provide to employees a written notice that informs them of
what information will be obtained, the purposes for which that information
will be used, and the privacy protections that will guard that information; 83
and may not deny health coverage or impose a cost that is greater than
thirty percent of the total cost of self-only health insurance. 84 The new
regulations make clear that “the use of incentives (financial or in-kind) in an
employee wellness program, whether in the form of a reward or penalty,
will not render the program involuntary if the maximum allowable incentive
available under the program” does not exceed the thirty percent
threshold. 85
Because Congress explicitly gave the EEOC authority to issue
regulations implementing the employment provisions of the ADA, the
Commission’s new wellness rule will be controlling if it reflects a reasonable
interpretation of the term “voluntary.” 86 In Part II of this piece, I argued that
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/eeoc-sueshoneywell.aspx.
77.
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See Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80
Fed. Reg. 21,659 (Apr. 20, 2015).
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See Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126
(May 17, 2016).

80.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(1) (2016).

81.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016).

82.
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83.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(iv) (2016).

84.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii), (3) (2016); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3). The self-only
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one plan; and if so, whether the wellness program is limited to participants in a
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the best interpretation of that term, in the context of the ADA’s provision
addressing workplace health programs, would bar employers from
providing any monetary incentive to reveal private medical information. If
my argument is correct, that is a reason why the EEOC should not have
adopted the definition of “voluntary” that it did in its recent regulations.
But it is not, in and of itself, a reason to invalidate those regulations. It is
hornbook administrative law—at least for now—that “if a statute is
ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable,
Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the
statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is
the best statutory interpretation.” 87 The question is not whether the EEOC’s
wellness rule adopts the best interpretation of “voluntary,” but instead
whether it adopts a reasonable one.
Even with this standard in view, however, there are good arguments
that the EEOC’s definition fails the test. According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation, the average annual premium for self-only coverage in the first
half of 2015 was $6251. 88 Thirty percent of that number is $1875.30. Note
that the median household income in 2014 was just under $54,000, and
forty percent of American households earned less than $42,000. 89 Many
workers would find it impossible to refuse to participate in a wellness
program when so much money is at stake. And even the $1875.30 figure
understates the cost that many employees will be required to pay under
the new rule. The Kaiser Family Foundation notes that “as a result of
differences in benefits, cost sharing, covered populations, and geographical
location, premiums vary significantly around the averages for both single
and family coverage.” 90 For eighteen percent of covered workers, the selfonly premium in 2015 was $7501 or higher, 91 which would mean that
employers could impose a cost of $2250.30—or even more—on workers
who refuse to provide their medical information. Forgoing so much money
would be a significant burden for all but the most comfortable workers.
Requiring workers to absorb such a cost to shield their private medical
information would not be, in any reasonable sense, understood as a
voluntary choice.
Another way of looking at this issue is to consider the proportionate
effect of a thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty on workers’ health insurance
bills. In 2015, the average employee’s share of self-only coverage was
87.

Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005).

88.
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(2015).
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eighteen percent of the total coverage cost. 92 Allowing an employer to
impose an additional thirty percent of the total cost on workers would more
than double such an employee’s insurance bill.
The Commission borrowed the thirty-percent rule from HIPAA and the
Affordable Care Act, which state that a health-contingent wellness program
can impose incentives of up to thirty percent of the total cost of self-only
coverage (fifty percent if the goal of the program is smoking cessation). 93
The EEOC’s regulations extend that rule to participatory wellness
programs. 94 Notably, HIPAA and the Affordable Care Act do not state that a
thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty is consistent with voluntariness; they
merely state that those two statutes do not prohibit employers from
imposing such a penalty on nonparticipating employees. 95 Nor do HIPAA
and the ACA preempt other federal regulation of wellness programs. To the
contrary, as the EEOC specifically recognized, the final ACA wellness
regulations specifically “recognize that compliance with HIPAA’s
nondiscrimination rules (as amended by the Affordable Care Act), including
the wellness program requirements, is not determinative of compliance
with any other provision of any other state or federal law, including, but not
limited to, the ADA.” 96 Taken together, HIPAA and the ACA on the one hand
and the ADA on the other impose two relevant requirements on workplace
wellness programs: (1) health-contingent programs may not impose a
penalty that exceeds thirty percent of the total cost of coverage or they will
violate the first two statutes, and (2) even if they satisfy that first
requirement, wellness programs of whatever type may not make medical
examinations or inquiries unless they are voluntary.
Because the ADA, unlike HIPAA and the ACA, imposes a voluntariness
requirement and because the ADA’s requirements stand independently of
the requirements of HIPAA and the ACA, the burden on the Commission
was to explain how the thirty percent rule was consistent with workers
making a voluntary choice to provide their medical information. Yet neither
the EEOC’s regulation itself nor the preamble to that regulation made any
attempt to explain why a choice made in the face of a threat to impose such
a large financial cost on nonparticipants is voluntary. 97 To be sure, the
Commission repeatedly asserted that the thirty-percent rule ensures that
the choice to participate is voluntary. But it never engaged with the
questions of how much burden a thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty will
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impose on workers and whether those workers will realistically be able to
refuse to participate in the face of such a large penalty. 98
Instead, the Commission’s only engagement with the relevant
questions, if it can be called that, came in a series of ipse dixit statements. 99
The Commission asserted that it had concluded “that allowing certain
incentives related to wellness programs, while limiting them to prevent
economic coercion that could render provision of medical information
involuntary, is the best way to effectuate the purposes of the wellness
program provisions of both” the ADA and HIPAA. 100 The Commission also
announced that it had
decided that by extending the 30 percent limit set under HIPAA and
the Affordable Care Act to include participatory wellness programs
that ask an employee to respond to a disability-related inquiry or
undergo a medical examination, this rule promotes the ADA’s
interest in ensuring that incentive limits are not so high as to make
participation in a wellness program involuntary. 101

And: “Nonetheless, although substantial, the Commission concludes
that, given current insurance rates, offering an incentive of up to 30 percent
of the total cost of self-only coverage does not, without more, render a
wellness program coercive.” 102 But the Commission made no effort to
explain the basis for these conclusions. Surely many workers would find a
penalty of nearly $2000—one that more than doubles their healthinsurance bill—to be one that imposes “economic coercion that could
render provision of medical information involuntary,” for example. 103 The
EEOC made no effort to explain why employees would not experience such
a penalty as coercive or under what conception of voluntariness such a
penalty would not be coercive. Because the EEOC did not explain how its
thirty-percent rule connected to the textual meaning of “voluntary” or any
of the normative considerations that underlie the application of that term,
the new rule hardly counts as an interpretation of the statutory term at all.
It is more apt to call the rule an agency announcement that certain practices
will satisfy the statute.
Under standard principles of administrative law, the EEOC’s series of
ipse dixit statements is insufficient to justify the Commission’s new thirty-
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See id.

99.

See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Rules and Regulations:
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(May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 1630).
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percent rule. 104 Agencies are required to “provide a reasoned explanation”
for new policies. 105 The “reasoned explanation” cannot “rest[ ] on reasoning
divorced from the statutory text.” 106 At least as judged by the Commission’s
contemporaneous statements—the only proper basis for evaluating an
agency action 107—the EEOC’s thirty percent rule scarcely rested on
reasoning at all, and it certainly did not rest on reasoning connected to the
statutory text. Just last term, the Supreme Court invalidated a Department
of Labor rule in which the agency supported its interpretation merely by ex
cathedra pronouncement rather than “by explaining why that policy ‘is
more consistent with statutory language’ than alternative policies.” 108 The
EEOC’s adoption of the thirty-percent rule for determining the
voluntariness of a wellness program’s requirement to provide medical
information should fall for the same reasons.

IV. Conclusion
My goals in this essay have been twofold. First, I have defended what I
take to be the best interpretation of the ADA’s voluntariness requirement
for medical inquiries that are part of workplace health programs. Under
that interpretation, an employer would not be permitted to give any
financial incentive—whether framed as a penalty or a reward—to
encourage workers to provide their private medical information. Second, I
have argued that the EEOC’s 2016 Wellness Rule not only fails to adopt the
best interpretation of “voluntary” but does not even adopt a reasonable
interpretation of that term. Accordingly, the thirty-percent rule should be
invalidated.
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